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Abstract
In this paper, we introduce a proxy for the legal protection of investors, a dummy variable
that indicates legal origins, into the Feldstein and Horioka (1980, Economic Journal 90)
saving−investment regression. The estimations show that in the French−civil−law countries,
which have the weakest investor protection, the domestic investment rates are generally less
strongly correlated with the domestic saving rates. This implies that in countries with less
investor protection, the capital resulting from an increase of domestic saving tends to flow to
foreign countries with stronger investor protection, rather than into domestic investment.
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In the absence of regulation in international ﬁnancial markets, the saving of
any country would ﬂow to countries with the most productive investment
opportunities. Therefore, domestic saving rates would be uncorrelated with
domestic investment rates. Feldstein and Horioka (1980), however, show that
these correlation do exist in the OECD countries, where capital is relatively
free to move. This fact is called the Feldstein-Horioka saving-investment puz-
zle. The saving-investment correlation is known to be robust to changes in
time period: 1974-1986 (Feldstein and Bacchetta (1991)), 1986-1990 (Obst-
feld (1995)), and so on. This fact is puzzling since the international ﬁnancial
markets today are less restrictive than they were in the periods estimated
by Feldstein and Horioka. Numerous papers attempt to explain or interpret
this with numerous reasons.1 As noted by Obstfeld (1995, p. 244), however,
“the cross-sectional ﬁnding . . . is more diﬃcult to explain in a world of
capital mobility.”
This paper investigates the relationship between the saving-investment
regression and law. In recent years, a number of papers have suggested a
strong relationship between ﬁnance and law. Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002)
demonstrate theoretically that better investor protection leads to higher in-
terest rates and eliminates the incentive for capital to ﬂow to countries with
poor protection of investors. On the empirical side, Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt and
Maksimovic (1998) show that in countries with more eﬃcient legal systems,
a greater fraction of ﬁrms are ﬁnanced by long-term external debt and eq-
uity. From these results, it is conjectured that domestic investment rates in
countries with poor protection of investors should be less strongly associated
with the domestic saving rates, whereas savings in countries with stronger
protection are invested domestically.
Our approach is quite simple. We introduce a proxy for the legal pro-
tection of investors, a dummy variable that indicates legal origins, into the
Feldstein and Horioka saving-investment regression. The dummy variable
consists of four legal origins: English common law, French civil law, Ger-
man civil law, and Scandinavian civil law. La Porta et al. (1996) show that
English-common-law countries have the strongest legal protection of investors
while French-civil-law countries have the weakest. Therefore, we anticipate
that an increase of saving in French-civil-law countries will tend to ﬂow into
investment opportunities in foreign countries instead of domestic investment.
If the protection of investors is still a problem in ﬁnancial markets, then do-
mestic investment rates could be correlated with domestic saving rates in
1See Obstfeld (1995) for a useful survey.
1recent years.
The key ﬁnding of this paper is that French-civil-law countries, particu-
larly in recent years, show a lower degree of association of domestic saving
and investment rates than countries with other legal origins. This means that
a large part of the saving-investment association is explained by legal origin.
Since the dummy variable represents the level of investor protection, this
suggests that the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle originates from the environment
of investment.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section
extends the Feldstein-Horioka regression for the period from 1970 to 2000.
Section 3 introduces the dummy variable of legal origin to the model. Section
4 concludes.
2 Simple Saving-Investment Regressions
Following Feldstein and Horioka (1980), we ﬁrst estimate a linear saving-
investment regression model,
(I=Y )i = ® + ¯(S=Y )i + "i (i = 1;:::;n); (1)
where (I=Y )i is the gross domestic investment rate, (S=Y )i is the gross na-
tional saving rate, and "i is the i.i.d. error with mean zero and variance ¾2.
We assume the strict exogeneity, E("ij1;(S=Y )i) = 0 for i = 1;:::;n, where
E(¢) is an expectation operator. We estimate Equation (1) for a sample of
20 OECD countries in 1970-2000, i.e., n = 20. The data are from the Penn
World Table 6.1 by Heston, Summers and Aten (2002). The sample includes
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. (I=Y )i
and (S=Y )i are averaged over the period. The hatted coeﬃcients denote the
ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates, hereafter.
Figure 1 plots the average ratio of domestic investment to GDP for the
sample countries against the ratio of domestic saving to GDP. The vertical
axis represents the domestic investment rate averaged in each period, and
the horizontal axis is the average domestic saving rate. For each period, the
distribution appears to have a positive slope. Moreover, it varies widely and
the slope has been moderate in more recent periods. The saving-investment
association remains, notwithstanding the freer recent capital mobility.
Table 1 shows the OLS estimation of Equation (1). The ﬁrst column rep-
resents the results using the averaged data over 1970-2000. As estimated by
Feldstein and Horioka, the coeﬃcient from OLS, ˆ ¯, is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
2from zero in our sample. For the estimations over decades, as shown in the
second through fourth column, ˆ ¯’s also reject the null hypothesis, but de-
crease in recent periods. Furthermore, The coeﬃcient of determination, R2,
is relatively small in the 1990s. These results seem to reﬂect the deregulation
and/or eﬀectiveness of international capital mobility. The domestic saving
and investment rates, however, are still strongly correlated.
3 Saving, Investment, and Law
Next we consider the relationship between the saving-investment association
and investor protection. Extending Equation (1), we estimate
(I=Y )i = ®0 + ®1Di + ¯0(S=Y )i + ¯1Di ¢ (S=Y )i + "i: (2)
where Di is a dummy variable which is unity if the commercial code of
country i originates from a certain legal system, and zero otherwise. Table 2
represents the legal origins for our sample countries, identiﬁed by La Porta
et al. (1998). Following La Porta et al., the commercial law is classiﬁed
into four origins: English common law, French civil law, German civil law,
and Scandinavian civil law. Each origin has signiﬁcantly diﬀerent degrees
of protection for investors. In general, French-civil-law countries have the
weakest investor protection while English-common-law countries have the
strongest.
Figure 2 plots the ratio of domestic investment to GDP against the ratio
of domestic saving to GDP for legal origins. The ﬁrst row plots the data
for English-common-law countries. In this case, the domestic saving and in-
vestment ratio are positively associated. Although the association appears
to be weaker for 1970-1979, stable relations are shown in each sample pe-
riod. For German-civil-law (third row) and Scandinavian-civil-law countries
(fourth row), the relationships have stable positive slopes. In these samples,
the slopes tend to be gentler in recent periods. For French-civil-law coun-
tries (second row), however, the saving-investment relations are ambiguous.
In addition, the distributions vary in each period, so the relations are not
stable. In particular, the slope is almost horizontal in 1990-2000, so that the
domestic saving and investment ratio seem to have no relationship.
The OLS estimation of Equation (2) over 1970-2000 is shown in Table
3. For each legal origin, the ˆ ¯0’s are positive and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero, and the relations are relatively strong. In English-common-law coun-
tries (ﬁrst column), the coeﬃcient of the dummy variable, ˆ ¯1, is positive and
signiﬁcant, so the saving and investment rates are strongly correlated. On
3the other hand, ˆ ¯1 in French-civil-law countries (second column) is signif-
icantly negative, and hence these countries have weaker relations between
saving and investment. In the German- and Scandinavian-civil-law countries
(third and fourth column respectively), the coeﬃcients of the dummies are
not signiﬁcant. As suggested by La Porta et al. (1998), English-common-
law countries have the strongest investor protection while French-civil-law
countries have the weakest. This fact is consistent with our results.
In order to check the robustness of this result, we estimate Equation (2)
over the decades. In 1970-1979, ˆ ¯1 for English-common-law and French-
civil-law countries have reverse signs. Yet, it is necessary to note that the
distributions of these samples are unstable, and that the international capital
market in the 1970s was more restrictive than in recent periods. In 1980-
1989, the English-common-law countries’ coeﬃcient of dummy variable is not
signiﬁcant, whereas the French-civil-law countries’ coeﬃcient is signiﬁcantly
negative and its adjusted R2 is relatively high. In 1990-2000, the ˆ ¯1 of
French-civil-law countries is smaller than that in the 1980s in absolute value
and is not statistically signiﬁcant. However, the F-statistic under the null
hypothesis that ¯0+¯1 = 0 is 0.508 and its p-value is 0.486. Therefore, in the
French-civil-law countries in the 1990s, the hypothesis that the saving and
investment rates were correlated is not rejected. The coeﬃcient of the cross
term in the German-civil-law countries is signiﬁcantly positive. According to
La Porta et al. (1998), German-civil-law countries have also strong investor
protection. Therefore, this estimate is not inconsistent with their ﬁndings.
In the French-civil-law countries, on the whole, ˆ ¯1 is signiﬁcantly negative,
that is, the saving-investment association is weaker. Moreover, ˆ ¯0 + ˆ ¯1 in
those countries is about half as small as in other countries. These results
imply that the saving-investment association will largely depend on the level
of investor protection.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we have investigated the relationship between domestic saving-
investment regression and law. Some recent papers suggest that countries
with more protections for investors have more active investments. If so, the
domestic investment rates in countries with high investor protection should
be associated with domestic saving rates. In this paper, we introduced a
proxy for the legal protection of investors, a dummy variable that indicates
legal origins, into the Feldstein and Horioka’s saving-investment regression.
The estimations show that in the French-civil-law countries, which have the
weakest investor protection, the domestic investment rates are generally less
4strongly correlated with the domestic saving rates. This implies that in
countries with less investor protection, the capital resulting from an increase
of domestic saving tends to ﬂow to foreign countries with stronger investor
protection, rather than into domestic investment.
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7Table 1: Cross-Sectional Regressions of Investment Rates on Saving Rates
Coeﬃcients 1970-2000 1970-1979 1980-1989 1990-2000
ˆ ® 0.072 *** 0.072 ** 0.080 *** 0.134 ***
(0.022) (0.025) (0.018) (0.028)
ˆ ¯ 0.707 *** 0.774 *** 0.677 *** 0.390 ***
(0.085) (0.091) (0.710) (0.109)
R2 0.792 0.802 0.835 0.414
Note: Standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate
statistical signiﬁcance at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively.
8Table 2: Sample Countries and Legal Origin
No Countries English French German Scandinavian
1 Australia 1 0 0 0
2 Austria 0 0 1 0
3 Belgium 0 1 0 0
4 Canada 1 0 0 0
5 Denmark 0 0 0 1
6 Finland 0 0 0 1
7 France 0 1 0 0
8 Germany 0 0 1 0
9 Greece 0 1 0 0
10 Ireland 1 0 0 0
11 Italy 0 1 0 0
12 Japan 0 0 1 0
13 Netherlands 0 1 0 0
14 New Zealand 1 0 0 0
15 Norway 0 0 0 1
16 Spain 0 1 0 0
17 Sweden 0 0 0 1
18 Switzerland 0 0 1 0
19 United Kingdom 1 0 0 0
20 United States 1 0 0 0
Note: Legal origins are from La Porta et al. (1998).




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































10Table 3: Cross-Sectional Regressions of Investment Rates on Saving Rates
and Legal Origins
Coeﬃcients Legal Origin
English French German Scandinavian
1970-2000
ˆ ®0 0.099 *** 0.043 *** 0.090 *** 0.072 **
(0.033) (0.012) (0.027) (0.025)
ˆ ®1 -0.055 0.294 *** -0.080 -0.060
(0.068) (0.413) (0.083) (0.067)
ˆ ¯0 0.613 *** 0.807 *** 0.626 *** 0.713 ***
(0.120) (0.046) (0.107) (0.100)
ˆ ¯1 0.199 -1.132 *** 0.301 0.171
(0.298) (0.163) (0.280) (0.236)
adj. R2 0.771 0.943 0.777 0.780
1970-1979
ˆ ®0 0.002 0.077 *** 0.069 ** 0.085 ***
(0.055) (0.024) (0.029) (0.026)
ˆ ®1 0.141 ** -0.508 * -0.083 -0.127
(0.065) (0.264) (0.144) (0.096)
ˆ ¯0 1.015 *** 0.748 *** 0.794 *** 0.719 ***
(0.184) (0.087) (0.108) (0.095)
ˆ ¯1 -0.616 ** 1.790 * 0.227 0.472
(0.243) (0.918) (0.449) (0.326)
adj. R2 0.843 0.814 0.776 0.800
1980-1989
ˆ ®0 0.088 *** 0.063 *** 0.093 *** 0.082 ***
(0.026) (0.017) (0.021) (0.022)
ˆ ®1 -0.017 0.146 ** -0.080 -0.038
(0.051) (0.054) (0.072) (0.050)
ˆ ¯0 0.650 *** 0.740 *** 0.622 *** 0.679 ***
(0.095) (0.066) (0.086) (0.089)
ˆ ¯1 0.060 -0.594 ** 0.295 0.104
(0.223) (0.225) (0.250) (0.181)
adj. R2 0.807 0.868 0.823 0.819
1990-2000
ˆ ®0 0.130 *** 0.099 ** 0.171 *** 0.131 ***
(0.035) (0.036) (0.023) (0.029)
ˆ ®1 0.048 0.096 -0.118 -0.105
(0.064) (0.060) (0.070) (0.100)
ˆ ¯0 0.418 *** 0.518 *** 0.212 ** 0.416 ***
(0.130) (0.135) (0.092) (0.116)
ˆ ¯1 -0.258 -0.382 0.553 ** 0.293
(0.265) (0.243) (0.247) (0.356)
adj. R2 0.387 0.400 0.670 0.433
Note: Standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate
statistical signiﬁcance at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively.
11